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Human Rights and Community Development in a 
U.S. Army Village in Okinawa
By Miyume Tanji
Introduction
Approximately 909 United States military facilities 
and 190,000 troops, located in 46 countries, represent the 
unparalleled ‘bases of empire’ today (Lutz 2009:1). The 
presence of Uncle Sam has been the reality for the post-
World War II Asia-Pacific region, especially in Japan, 
Korea and the Philippines (also in Thailand and Australia). 
Detrimental impacts on local societies inflicted by the U.S. 
military presence are recognised most commonly in terms 
of a diplomatic thorn in the side of stable bilateral alliances 
between the U.S. and the host countries of its troops. When 
local residents’ safety, dignity and well-being are threatened 
by U.S. military accidents and crimes, I argue, it is the ‘human 
rights’ of the individual residents that are being violated by 
the state.
This article examines how community development has 
contributed to partially reclaiming human rights in a village 
in central Okinawa. Yomitan Village has been living with 
active U.S. military bases for more than sixty years since the 
end of World War II. Its ‘village revitalization’ movement 
since the 1980s has successfully resisted the expansion of 
U.S. military trainings by constructing a ‘cultural village’ 
that integrates economic, spiritual, ecological and creative 
aspects of community living. Against the enthusiasm for 
modernisation led by the construction boom in the 1970-
80s Japan and Okinawa, Yomitan Village has deliberately 
revitalised a village of farming, traditional arts and crafts: 
an antithesis to the military’s culture of war and destruction. 
Ironically, Yomitan today is a popular temporary dwelling site 
among U.S. military members and other ‘expats’ attracted by 
the idyllic landscape and unique culture. 
Community development processes have improved the 
collective human rights in Yomitan Village: the villagers have 
claimed the rights to develop the culture and tradition unique to 
the village, which the Japanese state has been unable to protect 
from the conflicting demands of the U.S. military. However, 
these processes have had insufficient effect on reclaiming 
the individual human rights. Individual citizens are still not 
fully protected from the military presence. Yomitan today is 
a peculiar Okinawan village with a thriving cultural tradition 
that attracts outsiders, where, disturbingly, individual rights 
of the locals are disrespected. The controversy to do with U.S. 
military bases in Japan in particular has excessively focused 
on state-to-state legal and diplomatic solutions, with little 
perspective on individual human rights. Yomitan’s experience 
demonstrates the importance of community development that 
focuses on the collective rights of hosting communities of U.S. 
military bases, whilst nevertheless revealing the challenge of 
protecting individual rights.
1. Yomitan’s community development as 
civil disobedience against the U.S. military and 
Japanese colonialism
 ‘Okinawa’ is a name used in reference to the southernmost 
archipelago that was once a separate political entity: the 
Ryukyu Kingdom (1429–1879).1 Ryukyu was annexed by 
Japan as one of its border territories of the expanding empire 
before World War II (Morris-Suzuki 1996; Oguma 1998).2 
Since 1945, Okinawa has been a U.S. military colony known 
as the ‘Keystone of the Pacific’: a spoil of World War II. 
Okinawa was separated from Japan, under direct U.S. military 
administration from 1952-1972. Following Okinawa’s return 
to Japan, the U.S. Forces still continued to occupy 20% of land 
surface of Okinawa Main Island as well as multiple coastal and 
aerial training zones. These areas are off-limits to the local 
residents, whereas U.S. military personnel can legitimately 
go anywhere. The U.S. military occupation of Okinawa is a 
testament to Japanese colonialism: Japan exploits Okinawa as 
its colony to extract perceived benefits of the security alliance 
with the U.S. by imposing on it a majority (about 75%) of all 
U.S. Forces of Japan, a level of intensity not seen elsewhere in 
the country (Nomura 2005).
Yomitan Village is located on the west coast of central 
Okinawa Main Island (see map above), a particularly attractive 
place for many visitors. Today, in contrast with the adjacent 
Onna Village, which is crowded with major resort hotels and 
facilities obviously catering for mainland Japanese tourists, 
there is an old-fashioned and dignified feel to the place: 
farmlands, sugar cane fields, natural beaches, buildings with 
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traditional Ryukyuan architectural features of red tile roofs, 
stone walls and pavements. Yet, the presence of the U.S. 
military is prominent: schoolchildren cheerfully commute 
along the Army’s fence and barbed wire under the intermittent 
booming aircraft training sound, as if nothing unusual was 
happening.
The population of Yomitan is over 35,000, divided into 23 
districts (aza): self-governing micro-units of each under a 
few thousand resident members. Most aza predate World War 
II, some dating back to the administrative zoning during the 
Ryukyu Kingdom. In Yomitan, the aza organises day-to-day 
affairs related to education, health, production, death, marriage 
and cultural events that promote the local craft: pottery, music, 
dance, food. Funerals and annual rituals happen in the aza. A 
strong sense of community exists in Yomitan, characterised 
by a population small enough to know each other and to 
manage autonomous social structures; a sense of belonging 
and identity; holistic interactions among villagers in the realm 
of personal development beyond functional ties; members’ 
active engagement in the community; and the existence of a 
unique local-specific culture that members create, as opposed 
to consumption of a globalised mass culture (Ife & Tesoriero 
2006:96-98).
Today’s Yomitan is a product of ‘village reconstruction’ (mura 
okoshi) under former mayor Yamauchi Tokushin, who was 
in office between 1974 and 1998. It is a unique experiment 
of community development beyond the aza: an overarching 
‘Yomitan’ identity has developed under the ‘village 
reconstruction’ program. The village reconstruction played 
a crucial role in reclaiming pride and dignity in the village 
where the villagers’ basic rights had been blatantly relegated 
to secondary rung in relation to the military’s activities. 
Yomitan village’s reconstruction is often praised for 
successfully instigating sustainable economic development. 
It is considered to have resisted the prevailing Okinawan 
predicament: addiction to construction-based economic 
growth in the 1970-80s financed by the governmental 
subsidies paid in return for hosting U.S. military bases (for 
example, Miyamoto 2000; Sasaki 1999). Elsewhere, Okinawa 
has adopted this model, which irreversibly damaged its 
unique natural environment, while perpetuating Okinawa’s 
dependent underdevelopment (McCormack 1998). While 
Yomitan villagers have received rent and base-related 
subsidies from the government in proportion to the military 
presence, it promoted agriculture, especially sweet potatoes 
and sugar cane. It also promoted tourism based on locally-
owned land and capital (hotels and golf courses), rather than 
construction and dependence on mainland Japanese resort 
corporations, which is exceptional in Okinawa (Tanji 2009; 
Banasick 2005; Sasaki 1999). 
My focus here is how the village has reclaimed collective 
human rights in the process of community development, 
defined as ‘the right to benefit from economic development, 
the right to community cohesion and harmony’ (Ife 2010:114). 
Under the U.S. occupation following the Battle of Okinawa, 
this collective right was clearly denied to the people of 
Yomitan. In November 1946, when the villagers were allowed 
to re-settle, 95% of the total area of the village was under US 
military enclosure, secured for base construction. 
Yomitan’s community development was strongly inspired 
by a historiography of the Battle of Okinawa, a particularly 
bloody final stage of the Asia Pacific War, informed by the 
villagers’ experiences of collective suffering. About 180,000 
US soldiers landed on the coast in this village in April 1945. 
From Yomitan, war on the Island proceeded southward 
(Yomitan Sonshi Henshu Iinkai 2002:86, 90). During the 
Battle of Okinawa, both U.S. and mainland Japanese soldiers 
threatened villagers’ lives. Japanese soldiers deprived civilians 
of food and killed many, accusing them of being ‘spies’. In one 
of the natural limestone caves across Okinawa Main Island, 
where residents took refuge following the US landing in April 
1945, 82 Yomitan villagers (including 47 children) committed 
‘compulsory group suicide’ using grenades, knives and bare 
hands. In the mid-1980s, however, villagers obtained Yomitan 
survivors’ oral history and recorded their experience. The 
danger of conforming with the Japanese imperial ethos is 
repeatedly highlighted: affected by the imperial education that 
glorifies suicides and the shame attached to being captured 
by enemies, many family members committed the insane act 
of killing their loved ones (Field 1993:66-87). At the time, 
some villagers condemned the local historians for revisiting 
the scars of the survivors. However, discovering local history 
played an important role in founding the spiritual basis of 
rebuilding a new community ethos of ‘not to go with the 
flow’: resisting the post-war Japanese pressure to modernize, 
urbanise and, importantly, to co-operate in its security policy 
of concentrating the U.S. military presence in Okinawa (Tanji 
2009). These wartime personal experiences are now reflected 
in the Yomitan Village History (Yomitan Sonshi Henshu 
Iinkai 2002).
 
The Battle of Okinawa and the ensuing US military occupation 
in Yomitan are primarily remembered as displacement, fear 
and humiliation; above all, the disruption of autonomy and 
communal life. When Yamauchi first became mayor in 1974, 
more than 70% of the land was still occupied by the U.S. 
military. Yamauchi experienced the Battle of Okinawa as 
a child and became a history teacher before being a mayor. 
He recalls how two weeks after he took office, shrapnel from 
the Army’s explosives disposal field in the village had ended 
up in the residential area. Ideal locations in the village for 
the villagers’ activities, such as farming and manufacturing, 
were occupied by the U.S. military. Yamuchi was convinced 
that to regain the village’s collective rights to livelihood and 
production, it needed to specifically promote culture and 
agriculture. It was his belief that culture and agriculture stood 
for creative human activities as opposed to preparation for war 
and destruction, which the villagers were living with daily 
(Yamauchi 2007:57;107). Yamauchi’s ‘village reconstruction’ 
involved four core policies: 
  Theme: Human Rights and Community Development 
 
1) economic development driven by agriculture as a core 
industry and strategic marketing of local products;  
2) local ownership that controls environmental 
resources;  
3) promotion of Yomitan as a ‘cultural village’, by 
promoting local crafts and arts; and  
4) recovery of land from the US military.  
 
As the mayor led the anti-base struggle, the community held 
together strongly; the U.S. military conducted dangerous 
training sessions in Yomitan. Among others, the parachute 
‘drop’ training, conducted 3-4 times a month, most seriously 
threatened residents’ safety. Soldiers and pieces of military 
equipment were dropped from aircrafts flying 4,000 meters 
above ground, occasionally landing in residential areas, 
schools and farms. In 1965, a 10-year-old Yomitan girl was 
killed, squashed underneath a U.S. trailer dropped during the 
drop training. Shortly after this tragic incident, Yamauchi 
recalls, a piece of timber penetrated the roof of a resident’s 
home. Ever since, parachute training threatened residents’ 
livelihood: oil drums fell from the sky into the village; 
soldiers often shocked farmers by landing on their fields. 
Each time the training strayed from the Yomitan Auxiliary 
Airfield (where the training was conducted) into residential 
areas, Yamauchi appeared at the site and protested (2007:13-
14). The parachute training in Yomitan continued to threaten 
villagers’ lives. The mayor and villagers persistently protested 
against the training: for instance, in November 1981, villagers 
engaged in civil disobedience, physically blocking the U.S. 
Marines from reaching the training site (Yamauchi 2007:152-
153). The entire village participated in the protest, not just a 
number of activists: the mayor and village officials, public 
service 
unions, farmers and fishers co-ops, teachers unions, women’s 
organizations, youth groups, and senior citizens groups and 
aza cooperated in solidarity (Yamauchi & Mizushima 
1997:15). 
 
In the 1970s, the U.S. Air Force planned to construct a new 
anti-P3C antenna base. Yamauchi directly petitioned the then 
commander of the U.S. Marines to stop: even though initially 
being refused to meet, he waited in front of the restroom to 
catch him. The commander slowly opened up to him and 
recounted his own Native American heritage: he also likened 
the Yomitan Village’s struggle to that of his ancestors against 
the white American settlers. In an open letter, Yamauchi 
further petitioned then U.S. President Carter to cancel the 
construction (2007:249-50).3 After three years of villagers’ 
demonstrations and sit-ins organised by aza rotations, the 
military announced the cancellation of the antenna base 
construction in 1978. Following a similar set of petitions and 
protests, the village regained the unexploded bombs disposal 
site and opened the Yomitan Home of Pottery in 1978. This 
site became a cultural and economic asset of the village, with 
an old-style pottery kiln and 50 workshops. It has trained and 
employed young artists and further contributed to locally-
owned tourism replacing former US military sites. 
Furthermore, the mayor embarked on another attempt to build 
civic facilities for the villagers (a community centre, the 
village hall and an athletic stadium) at the heart of a U.S. 
Auxiliary Airfield. Initially this appeared to be a preposterous 
idea. The mayor justified this idea by stressing the local 
knowledge of feng shui (Yamauchi 2007:5-7). According to 
the feng shui reading, the Airfield is right on the crucial 
location of the village in relation to the mountains and the 
Figure 1  Yomitan Festival, November 2010 (photo taken by author) 
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ocean, where the spiritual centre of the village is situated 
and thus appropriate for central public facilities of the village 
(Tanji 2009). Finally, the Village Office was completed in 
the middle of the Airfield in 1997. Meanwhile the U.S. and 
Japanese governments decided to completely close the Airfield 
in 1996, as well as deciding to relocate the parachute training 
to Ie Island.4 In 2006, the land occupied by the U.S. military 
in Yomitan gradually fell to approximately 36% (Table 1). The 
Village Office is now planning the future development of the 
vacated former Airfield.
Table 1 Ratio of US military bases to the total       
              area of Yomitan Village 
Year Area Occupied by US Military Bases (ha) 







In reconstructing Yomitan as a ‘cultural village’, Yamauchi 
stressed the ‘old’ and ‘traditional’ aspects of indigenous 
arts and lifestyle, in a way that contrasts with what the 
U.S. military represented during the post-war occupation: 
modernity and mobility, embodied in its high-tech machinery 
and mega organization for destruction. Yamauchi made 
an effort to create an impression for the Americans that 
sophisticated culture and highly advanced civilization 
existed in Yomitan (2007:60), as embodied in the traditional 
weaving, characterised by distinctive flower-patterns specific 
to Yomitan. Yomitan weaving had existed for 600 years, but 
the industry had dwindled and was discontinued during the 
war. Since the 1960s, local elderly women, who had directly 
experienced the remaining weaving process, have contributed 
to the recovery of this skill. The village trained weavers and 
sponsored exhibitions in major Japanese cities. The sweet 
potatoes, pottery and weaving industries contribute to 
Yomitan’s image as a ‘cultural village’ instilling pride and 
identity in villagers (Yamauchi 2007: 108-9). 
Annually, in November, the performing arts, music, martial 
arts, crafts and the agricultural products, bonsai and local 
history are showcased in the Yomitan Festival that attracts 
around 100,000 people. The U.S. Army and Air Force 
commanders are invited as distinguished guests. Rank and 
file soldiers also are welcomed (Figure 1). Inviting the U.S. 
officers, military personnel and their families to cultural 
events, treating them to the local liquor and cuisines, all 
expenses paid by the locals, is an important means for the 
Yomitan villagers to demonstrate to the Americans that they 
are civilised people, even in many ways culturally superior 
to the Americans. It is also a way of demonstrating that the 
villagers are the owners of the village and that the military are 
but temporary residents, a message that is too often ignored 
by the states and the military establishments in both nations. 
Overall, Yomitan, amongst Okinawan localities living with 
Uncle Sam, most successfully developed a culture of human 
rights as constructed in ‘lived experience’ in the community, 
in ‘the shared and negotiated understandings of what it means 
to be human’ (Ife 2010:78). This requires ‘an integrated 
development, whereby social, economic, political, cultural, 
environmental and personal and spiritual development 
that represents the essential aspects’ of community life 
are addressed (Briskman 2007:162). Jim Ife explains that 
historically, various groups of people have been defined as 
Figure 2 
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somehow not deserving the same rights of ‘humans’: ‘sub-
humans’ in the case of Jews in the Holocaust; in the case 
of Indigenous Australians, being regarded as part of nature 
rather than humans. The collective rights of the communities 
are more in danger of being disrespected when they are 
regarded as racially inferior, backward in the modernity 
scale or having experienced a history of being colonised (Ife 
2010:69-73). The collective rights of groups endangered by 
and living nearby U.S. military deployments are often related 
to ethnicity, class and colonial conditions. Yomitan’s ‘village 
reconstruction’ managed to rebuild an identity deriving from 
a culture and lifestyle indigenous to the place, with a history 
spanning of more than 600 years. This is what the Americans 
- and especially its military personnel and their families - do 
not possess, being constantly stationed in different locations, 
which is part of their job requirements. Yomitan villagers 
have demonstrated their dignity as humans, based on cultural 
sophistication and superiority. 
Having said that, community development in Yomitan has 
had its limits in recovering the Japanese and U.S. alliance’s 
deficits that continue to endanger residents’ individual 
human rights. Even though parachute training is no longer 
conducted there, in November 2009, a hit-and-run incident 
within the former Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield revealed 
the insecurity and humiliation villagers still live with, in 
relation to the U.S. military. A 66-year-old Yomitan man 
was killed while jogging just before six in the morning in 
a hit-and-run accident on the road extending across the 
Airfield (Figure 2). The driver, an Army sergeant in his late 
20s, was arrested and persecuted locally in the Japanese 
court. According to the U.S. - Japanese Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA, Article XVII), the Japanese have the 
primary jurisdiction for incidents caused by U.S. military 
personnel during off-duty hours. 
Yomitan people and other Okinawan residents were deeply 
infuriated at this incident; the U.S. independent military 
newspaper Stars and Stripes (10 March 2010) analysis of 
the incident ‘drew fire from Okinawans because [the driver] 
refused to be questioned by Japanese police and prosecutors’ 
and, furthermore, SOFA exempted the sergeant from being 
‘handed over to Japanese authorities until he was indicted’. 
Indeed, the outrage was severe, evidenced by a group of 
Yomitan villagers who staged a hunger strike in front of the 
gate of Torii Station. Just how abusive and humiliating the 
incidents involving U.S. military drivers are for the locals is 
hard for the outsiders to fully comprehend without at least 
a minimal background understanding I am providing below.
2. SOFA and the distinction between 
individual and collective rights 
In a highly militarized society – in a ‘condensed’ space like 
Okinawa in particular - there many personal interactions occur 
between the military members and local civilians across the 
fence. Whilst most of them are of a positive and harmless nature, 
petty as well as heinous crimes do occur on- and off-base. 
Local women’s advocates in East Asia, for example, believe that 
‘the many acts of violence committed by U.S. military personnel 
against local women and children…happen far too often to be 
overlooked or accepted as random occurrences or aberrations’ 
(cited in Kirk and Francis 2000: 246). 
Driving in Okinawa, in particular for young U.S. military 
members, is tricky. Traffic rules (driving on the left lane 
instead of the right, much lower speed limits) are different, 
signs are mostly written in Japanese and other motorists are 
not fluent in English (and Americans, of course, usually speak 
little Japanese). Okinawan roads are extremely narrow and 
intricate even by Japanese standards. Besides, the Americans 
drive huge military trucks, humvees and much bigger vehicles 
off-base (locals and Japanese tourists predominantly choose 
much smaller cars appropriate for the road size) (Figure 2). 
The traffic incidents, which, not surprisingly, are common in 
Okinawa, guarantee complicated procedures involving the 
local police and the U.S. military police. Local residents, who 
know of the U.S. and Japanese governments’ SOFA arbitrary 
and politically motivated interpretations, are thus subjected to 
insecurity and not treated as dignified humans. 
The focal point of local residents’ opposition to SOFA in 
Japan (particularly Okinawa) is that the individual rights of 
the American military members are warranted at the expense 
of local residents’ individual right to be protected from harm 
by laws and regulations equally applied to all (Caron 1999:17). 
Between the U.S. and its allies, SOFAs prescribe the status 
of military members deployed in foreign countries regarding 
land lease, customs, taxes and jurisdiction of soldiers among 
others. SOFA between the U.S. and Japan, established in 1960, 
is modelled after the SOFA between the U.S. and other NATO 
member countries. It warrants the right of U.S. members of the 
military to be exempted from the local legal and social systems 
of Japan, where most are unfamiliar with the language, society 
and culture. The most prominent threat to local residents is the 
SOFA-based extra-territorial jurisdiction given to those U.S. 
military members who commit crimes in Japan. On principle, 
this all sounds straightforward but it is hardly so.
The U.S. rationale for extra-territorial jurisdiction in Japan 
is to protect the individual rights of the soldiers, civilians 
and their families belonging to the U.S. military vis-à-vis 
the Japanese system of law and order. The Japanese system 
does not offer the same individual rights U.S. law does to 
the accused. Scholars explain that the Japanese legal system 
places greater importance on confessions as part of the 
social correction processes of criminals (Foote 1992). This 
emphasis on social rehabilitation seems to compromise the 
individual rights of the accused. The emphasis the police 
place on extracting confession during crime investigation 
is noted as leading to sub-standard human rights practices. 
For obtaining confessions from the accused, the police rely 
on mental and physical coercion, which even involves the 
practice of using food, bathroom breaks and sleep during 
prolonged interrogation as bargaining chips. The rights to 
legal counsel and to be informed of their charges (known as 
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the Miranda rights in the U.S.) are hardly practiced in Japan 
(Norman 1996:725-29; 737). Stars and Stripes (January 14, 
2010) reports that the father of the driver who hit the Yomitan 
jogger and left him unattended is “very concerned about his 
son being in a foreign land dealing with a government that 
does not offer the same rights to its citizens as we do in the 
U.S.” In consideration of the alleged exceptionality of the 
Japanese legal system, the U.S. makes particular efforts to 
exempt U.S. military personnel from being subjected to the 
Japanese legal system. But aren’t the Japanese individuals 
entitled to the Miranda rights too? This question, however, is 
not a focal point of SOFA. 
The double standard justified by SOFA results in differential 
treatment of the U.S. military members who committed 
crimes in local communities: they are more likely acquitted 
or subjected to non-judicial penalties (salary deduction etc.) 
within the internal system of U.S. military jurisdiction and in 
military courts, details of which are usually not made known 
to non-U.S. civilians (including the victims of crimes and 
their families) (Cha 2010:503-506). For example, when local 
or non-U.S. women in Okinawa are raped, sexually assaulted 
or abused in other ways by U.S. military members or their 
families, they are less likely to expect fair results by placing 
charges. The commanding officers hold the authority to 
decide whether the offence was committed during military 
duties, in which case the U.S. has the primary jurisdiction. 
The officers can also request the Japanese government to 
waive Japan’s primary jurisdiction, when the offence is 
committed off-duty and only punishable by the Japanese 
law (Caron 1999:17; Cha 2010:503).5 Accused U.S. military 
personnel are also not held in Japanese custody before formal 
indictment, which gives greater opportunity for repatriation 
or transfer, after which the local police and victims cannot 
follow-up. Therefore, ‘a successful U.S. military prosecution 
for crimes of sexual violence…is difficult for a victimized 
Figure 3 






woman from a host country to obtain’ as they would be 
barred from the U.S. military court system, where they are 
unfamiliar with the language and culture anyway (Caron 
1999:14). The deciding factor is the lack of political will of the 
Japanese government to deny U.S. commanding officers’ sole 
and arbitrary discretion to treat the matter internally within 
the military system (Caron 1999:14). By giving favourable 
treatment to the U.S., the Japanese government has abrogated 
the responsibility to protect local residents’ human rights.6 
The rights of individuals with two different citizenships are 
at odds here, mostly in favour of the rights of a U.S. citizen, 
which is why the demand to amend SOFA has been made by 
human rights lawyers, for example in Korea (Smith 2006:16). 
It is too often overlooked that Japan also violates the individual 
human rights of their own citizens, in the process of sustaining 
unequal jurisdiction in favour of those from the U.S. The 
Japanese state thus neglects its responsibility to ‘guarantee 
its citizens equal protection under the law’ stated in Article 
26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Caron 1999:17). Often SOFAs are debated in terms of U.S. 
infringements of the host countries’ sovereignty, for example, 
of Japan, Korea and Iraq (Cha 2010). Indeed, host country 
citizens’ initial outrages against crimes committed by the U.S. 
troops against local individual persons usually quickly segue 
into the outrage at collective abuse of ‘Okinawa’, ‘Japan’ or 
‘Korea’. In this process, the lack of individual rights and the 
problematic legal environment within the social and legal 
system of host countries is overlooked. 
Another question that is not explored sufficiently in this 
context is how best are individuals’ rights – including 
women’s rights as human rights – promoted in the process of 
community development? SOFA is not just about sovereignty 
and unequal U.S.-Japan relations; prejudice and abuses of 
local women who fraternize with U.S. military members in 
local societies too often prohibit them to take their cases to 
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court. Considering rape of and violence against women and 
children of the military are highly politicised in Okinawa, it 
is disturbing that women’s rights as human rights remains a 
specialist concern of local women’s advocacy groups; it has 
not been sufficiently incorporated in the process of community 
development even in Yomitan. 
Conclusion: individual/collective human rights 
and community development
Residents living near U.S. military bases often suffer from 
the environmental and social hazards that are inevitable by-
products of their operations, such as noises, accidents, crimes 
and possibilities of contamination. Vieques Island in Puerto 
Rico, which the U.S. Navy occupied and where it conducted 
training until 2000, ‘[u]nfortunately….unlike Kahoolawe 
in Hawaii or most other American naval gunnery ranges, 
was populated’ (Calder 2007:176). From the military’s 
perspective, if the military bases are located in non-populated 
surroundings, there will be no considerations necessary for 
causing danger or inconvenience to residents. But when 
‘unfortunately’ the surroundings are populated, issues to do 
with human rights – of a collective nature – arise. The question 
is: what kind of people and community? For the people living 
near U.S. military bases, community development is essential 
for protecting the collective rights: to demonstrate that 
‘humans worthy of respect live here’. This is what Yomitan 
village has done extremely well. 
However, in Yomitan, no less than elsewhere in Okinawa, 
individuals feel they are treated in an undignified way and 
thus do not feel safe in the presence of the U.S. forces. It is 
after car accidents that local citizens most vividly know their 
being in a colonial status. This is just one of the ways how 
‘American imperialism actually works’ (Johnson 2006:171). 
I argue that it is necessary to clearly distinguish between 
the individual and collective nature of human rights at stake 
near U.S. military outposts and activities. The individual 
rights of local residents that could be threatened by the U.S. 
military presence, in sum, include to live in safety and to be 
treated with fairness, dignity and respect. This article has 
discussed Yomitan’s relative success in advancing collective 
human rights in the process of community development in 
Okinawa. Its experience, nevertheless, also highlights the 
weak link between individual human rights and community 
development.               
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(Endnotes)
1  Okinawa Prefecture consists of hundreds of islands of the Ryukyu 
Archipelago. The Ryukyu Kingdom was a small tributary state of 
China, encompassing the islands in the Ryukyu Archipelago. Since 
1609, the Shimazu clan of Kyushu invaded the Kingdom and subjugated 
it under its rule; nevertheless, the kingdom kept nominal independence 
until 1879, when Japan annexed it as its southern border territory, the 
Okinawa prefecture.
2   These include Hokkaido, Kurile Islands, Taiwan and Korea and the 
Pacific Islands.
3  The government accused the mayor’s behaviour for interfering with 
diplomatic and security affairs consequently that only the central 
government had the authority to deal with (Yamauchi 2007 118).
4   See (The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) 1996).
5.  See U.S. Department of Defense, DIR. No. 5525.1, Status of Forces 
Policy and Information section 4.5, 1979, available at http://www.dtic.
mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/552501p.pdf Accessed 1/5/2011.
6   High profile cases, such as that of the 1995 rape incident of a child in 
Okinawa and the death of two Korean girls run over by a U.S. military 
tank, usually affect both publicity and leniency of sentences to favour 
the locals’ sentiments (Cha 2010:506-508).                          
